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abstract 
In the last two centuries, Muslim modernists have introduced major 
legal reforms that led to the restriction of  the range and scope of  Islamic 
Shari’a Law and the overhaul of  legal thought and practice in the Muslim 
World. Nevertheless, every time a new legal reform is proposed, it is met 
with outcries from Islamists who label it un-Islamic and blasphemy against 
God. This paper examines some major premodern scholars of  Islamic 
jurisprudence whose thought and practice about Shari’a Law featured 
tremendous flexibility in the way they understood their role as legislators and 
accepted a diversity of  rules. The paper shows how important Islamic history 
is for a proper understanding of  Islamic Shari’a Law, which accommodates 
change and constant interpretation.
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resumo
Nos últimos dois séculos, os modernistas muçulmanos introduziram 
reformas legais importantes que levaram à restrição do alcance e do escopo 
do Direito islâmico da Shari’a e à revisão do pensamento e da prática 
legais no mundo muçulmano. No entanto, toda vez que uma nova reforma 
legal é proposta, ela é recebida com protestos de islamistas que a rotulam 
como anti-islâmica e blasfêmia contra Deus. Este artigo examina alguns 
importantes estudiosos pré-modernos da jurisprudência islâmica, cujo 
pensamento e cuja prática sobre o Direito da Shari’a apresentavam uma 
tremenda flexibilidade na maneira como eles entendiam seu papel como 
legisladores e aceitavam uma diversidade de regras. O artigo mostra como a 
história islâmica é importante para uma compreensão adequada da Shari’a, 
que acomoda a mudança e a interpretação constante.
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1. introduction
In a speech on the National Women’s Day on 13 
August 2018, the Tunisian President Mohamed Beji 
Caid Essebsi endorsed the Colibe report (issued by the 
Commission of  Individual Liberties and Equality on 1 
June 20181) and announced that he will submit a request 
to Parliament to amend the law of  inheritance, giving 
women and men equal rights. Essebsi’s announcement 
was met with angry reactions from many Tunisian 
Islamists who alleged that it contradicts the terms 
of  Islamic Shari’a law, which assigns to men a higher 
share of  inheritance than to women. Al-Azhar, the 
most influential religious institution in Sunni Islam and 
based in Egypt, joined the fray. It issued a declaration 
that labeled the proposal un-Islamic because it violates 
the clear stipulation of  God’s revelation, specifically 
verse 11 of  chapter 4 in the Qur’an: “God commands 
you that a son should have the equivalent share of  two 
daughters.”
The objection of  Tunisian Islamists, al-Azhar, 
and other Islamist groups is grounded in a highly 
contentious belief  that Muslims (and humans in general) 
have no authority or agency to amend what God has 
clearly and definitively stipulated in the Qur’an. It might 
sound astonishing to many today that this view is not 
in agreement with the position of  most premodern 
Muslim jurists who had a fundamental role in defining 
and laying out the theoretical and practical apparatus 
of  Islamic Shari’a law. It is also not in agreement with 
the general tendency of  these same groups who have 
supported major overhaul and modification of  Shari’a 
law in recent decades. This paper will examine some 
discussions by leading legal jurists from premodern 
times in order to show the flexibility with which they 
dealt with issues pertaining to Shari’a and what role 
they gave to the legal injunctions of  the Qur’an. It 
highlights the importance of  history in understanding 
the dynamics of  Islamic Shari’a law, and exposes the 
manipulation of  religion done today by some Islamist 
groups, whose rejection of  certain initiatives to amend 
Shari’a law is politically motivated.
1  The reports was issued in three languages: Arabic (https://
colibe.org/التقرير/?lang=ar), French (https://colibe.org/le-
rapport/), and English (https://colibe.org/report/?lang=en).
2. the historical record
The historical record demonstrates that the 
overwhelming majority of  Muslim jurists throughout 
the centuries did not take the word of  the Qur’an 
literally as something absolute, and sometimes ruled 
on matters without first examining the Qur’an.2 When 
they took notice of  what the Qur’an stipulates, they 
either freely amended the text by playing it against 
other revealed sources (other qur’anic verses, Sunna of  
Muhammad, Bible, etc.) or ignored it and heeded the 
views of  the founding fathers (mainly, the Companions 
of  Muhammad and their successors). They even devised 
hermeneutical tools in order to make the Qur’an say 
something different from the literal meaning.
An example that displays this tendency on the part of  
premodern Muslim jurists is the following from a very 
influential legal text by Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037), 
who was a significant Sunni legal theorist and belonged 
to the Sunni sub-school known as the Shafi’i school.3 
In his discussion of  the permissibility of  seafood, al-
Baghdadi noted not only the broad disagreement among 
schools but also the one within his own:
The followers of  al-Shafi’i disagree concerning 
aquatic animals. Some claim that fish are permissible 
but that frogs are forbidden. Others say that if  the 
animal is in the form of  a fish or of  an animal 
ritually slaughtered in good faith then the eating 
of  it is permitted if  it comes from the sea without 
being ritually slaughtered; however, if  it is of  a form 
of  something which is not permitted to be eaten in 
good faith, then one is forbidden to eat it. This is 
the judgement of  Abu Thawr.
Others say that everything from the sea is to be 
judged by the law of  fish except the frog which is 
forbidden because the Prophet forbade killing it. 
This is the judgement of  ‘Ali ibn Khayran.
Malik and Rabi’a declare all aquatic animals 
allowable, even the tortoise and the like. This is 
suggested by a report from Abu Bakr who said: 
“There is nothing in the sea besides animals which 
2  For a new pioneering study on early Islamic legal thought, see 
Lena Salaymeh, The Beginnings of  Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate 
Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
3  Sunni Islam is branched into several schools, of  which only 
five exist today: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Zahiri. Each of  
these schools has its own Shari’a system, and they disagree on some 
fundamental aspects of  legal theory and practice. As a result of  
modern legal reforms and the creation of  nation states, most Sunnis 
today are not aware of  this diversity, and the realm of  each school, 
except in two countries (Saudi Arabia and Iran), has been reduced to 
a very small area: family law, marriage, inheritance, religious rituals, 
and the like.
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God would slaughter for you.”
Abu Hanifa forbids everything which does not have 
the form of  a fish among the aquatic animals.4
Even though the discussion is about practice (what 
seafood is legitimate to eat and what is not), it actually 
exposes the complexity of  legal theory in the first 
centuries of  Islam, which left its mark on the nature of  
Islamic Shari’a law since. It is rather astonishing that the 
Qur’an – which actually provides a statement on this 
issue: “Licit for you is the game of  the sea and its food” 
(Q. 5.96) – is not cited or even mentioned. Al-Baghdadi 
gave four differing views as reflective of  what was 
accepted among Sunni jurists. One view references the 
prophet Muhammad, who only forbad eating the frog 
(probably on account of  it being amphibious, meaning it 
belongs to two realms). Another view cites the opinion 
of  the first caliph Abu Bakr, who allowed everything 
in the sea.5 A third view is attributed to a leading jurist 
from the ninth century named Abu Thawr (d. 854) who 
only legitimized the eating of  seafood that looks like 
fish or is similar in shape to land animals that are edible. 
A fourth view is ascribed to Abu Hanifa (d. 767) – the 
eponym of  the most popular school of  Sunnism (the 
Hanafi school) – who declared that for seafood to be 
edible it must be in the form of  a fish (which is very 
likely based on Jewish law, specifically Leviticus 11:9).
The discussion effectively means that medieval Sunni 
jurists placed on the same par the practice (Sunna) of  
the prophet Muhammad, the view of  caliph Abu Bakr, 
and the views of  jurists Abu Hanifa and Abu Thawr. 
Al-Baghdadi did not say that Muslims must look into 
the Qur’an and follow verbatim what it says, which 
would have disallowed the views expressed by prophet 
Muhammad, Abu Hanifa, and Abu Thawr. 
It is also interesting to point that al-Baghdadi’s 
discussion underlines the two aspects of  law: the 
dynamic and the static. The opinions of  Muhammad, 
Abu Bakr, Abu Hanifa, and Abu Thawr were expressed 
as part of  the dynamic process of  law making. Over 
time, they became static laws.
A second example comes from another powerful 
4  Al-Baghdadi, Usul al-din, translated in Andrew Rippin and Jan 
Knappert, Textual Sources for the Study of  Islam (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1990), 106.
5  It is unclear if  Abu Bakr based his view on Qur’an 5:96. It 
seems rather obvious that al-Baghdadi did not make a connection 
between the two and assumed that Abu Bakr’s view reflected his 
personal opinion.
legal manual by the jurist Ibn Qudama (d. 1223), who 
was a renowned theorist of  the Hanbali school of  
Sunni law. In his discussion of  the maximum duration 
of  a pregnancy, Ibn Qudama admitted that there is no 
agreement among Sunnis on this question, and he listed 
the different views about it, which range from two years 
to no limit.
• 2 years: ‘A’isha6 (d. 678), Abu Hanifa7 (d. 767), 
Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778), and Ibn Hanbal8 (d. 
855).
• 3 years: Al-Layth b. Sa’d (d. 791)
• 4 years: the overwhelming view of  the Hanbalis, 
al-Shafi’i9 (d. 820), the popular view of  Malik10 
(d. 795).
• 5 years: ‘Abbad b. al-’Awwam (d. 804).
• 6 years: al-Zuhri (d. 741).
• 7 years: another view attributed to al-Zuhri.
• No limit: Abu ‘Ubayd (d. 838).11
As the above list shows, medieval Muslim jurists 
did not have a uniform position about the maximum 
duration of  a pregnancy. We find this disagreement not 
only between leading jurists, but also within the same 
schools. We also find missing in this discussion the 
view of  the Qur’an, which actually addresses the issue 
of  pregnancy in the verse that says: “its bearing and 
weaning are thirty months” (Q. 46.15). Thus, according 
to the Qur’an, it takes thirty month to conceive of  and 
nurse an infant. Although the text does not specify the 
exact length of  each stage, it is rather evident that if  the 
two stages cannot exceed two and a half  years,12 then the 
pregnancy itself  must be less than that. (Interestingly, 
the view of  al-Azhar has been consistent with the list 
above rather than with the explicit text of  the Qur’an).13
How come we find premodern Muslim jurists and 
schools of  Shari’a disagreed with the Qur’an? The direct 
6  Wife of  Muhammad, she was a major transmitter of  hadiths 
and her statements feature in many discussions about Islamic law.
7  Major early jurist who is the eponym of  the Hanafi school.
8  Major early jurist who is the eponym of  the Hanbali school.
9  Major early jurist who is the eponym of  the Shafi’i school.
10  Major early jurist who is the eponym of  the Maliki school.
11  Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1968), 
8:121–122.
12  If  the Qur’an actually means 30 lunar months, then the entire 
period would be equivalent to 2 years and 5 months in the common 
calendar.
13  See for example the position expressed by the vice 
president of  the Azhar University: <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6IV4JRdes0A> (accessed on 3 February 2019).
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answer is that the Qur’an was not the starting point or 
the absolute authoritative text when it came to Islamic 
legal theory and practice. We thus realize how flawed it 
is to classify the Qur’an as the starting point of  Islamic 
law (and Islamic thought in general) as some modern 
scholars have argued.14 Moreover, in this discussion of  
the maximum length of  a pregnancy, we also see the 
dynamic aspect of  Islamic law in its formative phase 
(the conversations and differing views of  early jurists), 
which became later on the static legal framework by 
which many jurists abided.
The dynamism and diversity of  classical Islamic legal 
theory and practice was informed by a fundamental 
presupposition that essentially delegated to the jurist 
the task to “poking” in God’s mind and determine 
what God intended. This is best expressed in the 
following words of  one of  the most authoritative Sunni 
theologian/jurist, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111). 
They convey the general attitude of  many jurists when 
it came to determining Shari’a law. Al-Ghazali listed 
four pivots that represent a road map for the jurist, and 
inform the principles of  Islamic law and how to deduce 
laws from the sources:
1. The first pivot is the fruit, which refers to 
the rules themselves: mandatory, prohibitive, 
suggestive, restrictive, permissive, reprehensible, 
etc.
2. The second pivot is the fruit-bearer, which 
refers to the three sources: the Book, the Sunna, 
and Consensus and nothing else.
3. The third pivot is the method of  harvesting, 
which refers to the methods of  inquiry: 
according to the explicit meaning, implicit 
meaning, pervasive use, or rational and 
deductive analysis.
4. The fourth pivot is the harvester, who is the 
seeker.15
It is clear that for al-Ghazali, deducing laws from the 
fundamental sources is not a passive process. Rather it 
hinges on the seeking jurist following a sophisticated 
method of  inquiry. The jurist must carefully examine 
14  See, for example, Wael B. Hallaq, A History of  Islamic Legal 
Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 1.
15  Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, ed. Muhammad al-Shafi (Beirut: Dar 
al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyya, 1993), 7.
the language (laid out in no. 3) in order to produce from 
the sources (the Qur’an, the Sunna of  Muhammad 
and the Consensus of  early jurists) the different types 
of  rules (enumerated in no. 1) and thus define Shari’a 
law. As such, the sources do not speak for themselves. 
They need the jurist to say what they mean according 
to a set of  hermeneutical tools, which, for all intents 
and purposes, become as important as the sources 
themselves.
Al-Ghazali’s view is one of  many variant views on the 
sources and tools that form the bases of  the principles 
of  Islamic Shari’a law. And it is true that Muslim jurists 
never agreed on these sources/tools and their ranking. 
However, their disagreement is often over who is 
entrusted to be a seeker, and whether this is something 
divinely ordained to a specific lineage or attained by any 
Muslim through study and expertise. For instance, Shi’i 
jurists take the Imam (often nicknamed the Speaking 
Qur’an)16 as God’s delegate to be the absolute source 
on legal and religious matters; it is no surprise that 
adherence to the Imam and his teachings is the main 
tenet of  Shi’ism. Jurist al-Qadi al-Nu’man (d. 974) best 
expressed this premise:
God revealed His Book, gathered together in it all 
the religious obligations that he imposed on the 
worshipers, clarified in it that which He saw fit to 
clarify, and left ambiguous in it that which He saw fit 
to leave ambiguous. He did this in order to compel 
the worshipers thereby to need those whom He 
made superior to them and obedience to whom He 
imposed as an obligation of  the faith, and in order 
to guide them to the Imams. He taught the Imams 
exclusively knowledge of  the religion, and caused 
the believers to need the Imams in that regard.17
Thus, according to al-Qadi al-Nu’man, the Imams, 
and only them, can speak on behalf  of  God and clarify 
to their followers God’s laws which he communicated in 
the Qur’an, the clear therein and the hidden. It follows, 
therefore, that the believers should not seek on their 
own the Qur’an directly because doing so will lead them 
to error.
Besides, Shari’a has other principles that govern the 
thinking process of  the jurists. They fit under the broad 
16  On the Imam as the speaking Qur’an, see Muhammad Ali 
Amir-Moezzi, The Silent Qur’an & the Speaking Qur’an: Scriptural 
Sources of  Islam between History and Fervor, trans. Eric Ormsby (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
17  Al-Qadi al-Nu’man, Disagreements of  the Jurists: A Manual of  
Islamic Legal Theory, ed. and trans. Devin J. Stewart (New York: New 
York University Press, 2015), 45.
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concept of  what some modern jurists call Maqasid al-
Shari’a (Objectives of  Shari’a).18 Three are significant: 
istihsan (subjective reasoning), maslaha (public welfare), 
and darura (dire necessity). The Objectives of  Shari’a 
take their logic from the belief  that Shari’a has a 
purpose, and this purpose is to benefit those who 
believe in God.19 So, the rules of  Shari’a are simply the 
means to achieve this aim and what God truly intended.
This is best summed up in the following words of  
the famous Tunisian jurist Ibn ‘Ashur (d. 1973), which 
bring to mind the view of  al-Ghazzali discussed above:
In instituting the commands, the Lawgiver has 
primary and secondary objectives. Some of  these 
are explicitly stated, some merely alluded to, 
while others are to be inferred from the texts. We 
therefore conclude from this that whatever is not 
clearly stated but can be arrived at from induction, 
is intended by the Lawgiver.20
The words of  Ibn ‘Ashur, like those examined 
previously, point to the realization among most Muslim 
jurists about the complexity of  defining Shari’a law, 
and the important role of  the jurists in determining, on 
behalf  of  God, God’s intent. Therefore, the jurist must 
always subject the textual sources to a rigorous process 
of  examination and inquiry in order to make sure that 
what is intended by the Lawgiver is made known.
3. modernity and islamic laW
The advent of  modernity in the nineteenth century 
caused a major change in the attitudes of  Muslims 
towards Shari’a law and its realm and legal apparatus. I 
precisely mean here the adoption of  a new legal system 
in every Muslim country based on a modern constitution 
that in some cases superseded Shari’a, limited Shari’a 
to a specific realm, or functioned in parallel to Shari’a. 
Muslim reformers realized that political reform (which 
they saw as the fundamental step towards the political 
empowerment of  the Muslim World against European 
18  On the notion of  “Objectives of  Shari’a, see the studies in 
Adis Duderija (ed.), Maqasid al-Shari’a and Contemporary Reformist 
Muslim Thought: An Examination (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
19  On the premodern debate regarding whether there is such 
a purpose, see Rami Koujah, “Divine Purposiveness and its 
Implications in Legal Theory: The Interplay of  Kalam and Usul al-
Fiqh,” Islamic Law and Society 24 (2016): 171–210.
20  Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn ‘Ashur, Maqasid al-shari’a al-islamiyya 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 2011), 20.
hegemony) could not be achieved unless the Shari’a is 
heavily reformed and reduced to a small realm (primarily 
marriage contracts, inheritance, religious rituals, and the 
like).
Modernists have argued that the true teachings 
of  Islam and the voice of  the Qur’an show that God 
delegated the legislative matters to the Muslims to 
decide them. For instance, in his Proposed Political, Legal, 
and Social Reforms, the Indian modernist Cherágh Ali 
(d. 1895) declared that “the only law of  Mohammad 
or Islam is the Korán.”21 Then he contended that, “the 
Korán does not profess to teach a social and political 
law” and that “it was neither the object of  the Korán, 
the Mohammadan Revealed Law, to give particular and 
detailed instructions in the Civil Law, nor to lay down 
general principles of  jurisprudence.”22 He concluded 
by saying that the Islamic tradition “unfetters us” 
from traditional Shari’a, and “encourages us to base all 
legislation on the living needs of  the present, and not 
on the fossilized ideas of  the past.”23
Similarly, the great religious reformist Muhammad 
‘Abduh (d. 1908) of  Egypt divided Islam into two 
components: 1) beliefs and religious practices, and 2) 
social relations. He posited that beliefs and religious 
practices are regulated by God and Muhammad, and the 
Muslims (be they individually or communally) cannot 
change these rules. Social relations, however, are to be 
determined by the Muslims themselves because civil law 
has to conform to the ever-changing conditions of  the 
Muslims.24 ‘Abduh also introduced the very powerful 
concept of  talfiq (hybridization) in order to allow the 
jurist to bypass the limitations of  his own school and 
reach outside of  it to another school if  its Shari’a is more 
appropriate for particular purposes.25 The success of  
‘Abduh’s hybridization system is so widespread among 
Sunnis that the majority do not uphold anymore to the 
strict school system (most Sunnis today might not even 
know to which school of  Sunni law they belong, or are 
21  Cherágh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in 
Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammadan States (Bombay: Education 
Society’s Press, 1883), ii.
22  Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms, xiv.
23  Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms, xl.
24  Muhammad ‘Abduh, “iIkhtilaf  al-qawanin bi-ikhtilaf  ahwal 
al-umam,” in al-A’mal al-Kamila, ed. Muhammad ‘Imara (Beirut: al-
Mu’assasa al-’Arabiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1972).
25  On the notion of  “hybridization,” see Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, “Shari’ah and Civil Law: Towards a Methodology of  
Harmonization,” Islamic Law and Society 14.3 (2007): 391–420.
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not aware that there is not one single Shari’a in Islam).
Modern Muslim jurists have generally accepted the 
logic that changing conditions necessitate changing 
Shari’a laws. I will discuss two examples that illustrate 
this tendency. They relate to two components of  the 
pilgrimage (Hajj) rituals: one is the quota placed on the 
number of  Muslims who could make the Hajj each year, 
and the other is the restriction on animal sacrifice that 
each pilgrim is mandated to offer at the conclusion of  
the pilgrimage. Both of  these measures amend prior 
laws set by all classical schools of  Shari’a.
According to the Qur’an (verse 3: 97), “Pilgrimage 
to the House (Ka’ba) is a duty owed to God by people 
who are able to undertake it.” Jurists have understood 
it to mean that those who do not have the financial 
means or good health are exempted from this religious 
requirement. But as a result of  the massive increase in 
the number of  pilgrims coming to Mecca in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia requested 
that Muslim jurists support a rule to limit the number 
of  Muslims who could make the pilgrimage each year 
because the venues cannot accommodate everyone who 
wants to come. The decision was to set a yearly quota 
per country: one in every thousand Muslims can make 
the pilgrimage in any given year, and this was ratified by 
the Organization of  Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in its 
meeting held in Jordan in March 1988.
A similar petition by the King of  Saudi Arabia was 
submitted to the Supreme Council of  Senior Religious 
Scholars in Saudi Arabia to impose a limit on the number 
of  Muslims inside the Kingdom. It was discussed and 
approved by the Council on 1 August 1997. The fatwa 
that the Council issued gives the following rationale for 
placing a limit on the number of  pilgrims:
The Council discussed the reality of  the matter 
with respect to the Hajj and what the pilgrims 
experience in terms of  excessive congestion at 
many of  the ritual sites, roads, and places, which 
is caused by the surge in the numbers of  pilgrims 
in the last few years. This is happening despite the 
efforts that the government of  Saudi Arabia – may 
God make it successful – has undertaken in order 
to ease the access to ritual sites and the continuous 
measures it is adopting every year to facilitate to the 
Muslims the performance of  the Hajj. … As such, 
the Council of  Senior Religious Scholars does not 
see any reason to prevent a policy that organizes 
the Saudi pilgrims, including that, as long as dire 
necessity requires it, the government not permit 
who performs the Hajj to repeat it unless five years 
have lapsed, as is the case with non-citizens who 
reside in the Kingdom.26
It is clear from the text quoted above that what 
necessitates amending Shari’a law and imposing a 
restriction on the number of  pilgrims is the issue 
of  congestion that is harmful to pilgrims. Thus, the 
principle of  dire necessity allows the jurist to amend 
Shari’a law.
The second case also relates imposing restrictions 
for reasons that have to do with problems caused by 
the changing circumstances. Classical schools of  Shari’a 
unanimously stipulated that at the conclusion of  the 
Hajj rituals, each pilgrim must offer an animal sacrifice 
and administer it in person, or at least be present during 
the slaughter. Due to the massive number of  pilgrims 
converging on Mecca, the practice has become a 
sanitary and organizational nightmare. Jurists could not 
ban the practice outright because it was well entrenched 
in religious law. Instead, they issued a restriction in the 
form of  an encouragement to pilgrims to delegate this 
ritual to an organization that would do the sacrifice 
on behalf  of  the pilgrim, provided it meets certain 
requirements. Instead of  offering a sacrifice, pilgrims 
are now “encouraged” to purchase a certificate stating 
they have fulfilled the obligatory ritual of  sacrifice. 
Below is a legal fatwa issued in 2010 by the former mufti 
of  Jordan Nuh Ali Salman, which allows the pilgrims to 
delegate a company to do the sacrifice on their behalf:
It is permissible to delegate the purchase and 
slaughter of  sacrificial animals to others. Thus, it is 
not prohibited according to Shari’a for the Muslim 
to delegate this to a trustworthy company. He 
pays to it the cost of  the sacrificial animal, and the 
company purchases and slaughters the animal, even 
if  it takes place in a country outside the Kingdom 
of  Saudi Arabia, because elsewhere the animals are 
cheaper. But there are a few conditions that must 
be observed:
• The slaughter must occur on the day of  the 
Adha Holiday or the three days that follow it.
• The sacrificial animal should not be younger 
than five years for camels, two years for cattle 
or goats, six months for sheep provided they 
are fattened.
• The sacrificed animals must contain no 
blemishes or disabilities that compromise their 
shape; for example, it is not permissible to 
sacrifice an animal that has lost an eye.
26  The fatwa is posted on <http://almoslim.net/node/217782> 
(accessed 3 February 2019).
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• Some of  the meat must be distributed to poor 
Muslims.
• If  the company is delegated to slaughter 
for many people, the butchers must have a 
list of  the names of  delegators, and should 
mention each one ahead of  the slaughter of  
the corresponding animal, and say that it is 
sacrificed on behalf  of  so-and-so. I am told that 
the companies that offer such a service do so.
• In conclusion, we thank those companies that 
do this service because they facilitate for the 
Muslims the fulfillment of  this ritual, at a cost 
most Muslims can afford. May God reward 
them well.27
In this fatwa as well, it is evident that the notions of  
public welfare and dire necessity, and given the noble 
objectives of  Shari’a, give the modern jurists power to 
amend any stipulation pertaining to Islamic law. This 
shows the willingness of  modern jurists to amend the 
law, and the extent to which Islamic law operates today 
according to modern concerns and priorities.
4. conclusion
The initiative of  the Tunisian president Essebsi to 
propose an amendment to the Shari’a law in Tunisia that 
would make inheritance equal between men and women 
seems to be in agreement with the general tendency of  
classical Muslim jurists throughout the centuries whose 
understanding of  Shari’a law was dynamic. It is also 
in agreement with the general tendency of  modern 
Muslim jurists who have been open in countless 
occasions to amend Shari’a law and limit its application. 
Muslim jurists have operated throughout the centuries 
with the understanding that Islamic Jurisprudence does 
not mean blind adherence to the literal dictate of  the 
Qur’an, but rather finding God’s intent and what is best 
for the Muslims. They produced a huge diversity within 
Shari’a law, and developed a complex system not only 
for devising laws but also for amending them, and this 
system is still in practice today, albeit limited to a smaller 
realm than in premodern times. The condemnation 
expressed by al-Azhar and many Islamists of  Essebsi’s 
proposal seems therefore a political statement and an 
27  Posted on <http://aliftaa.jo/Question.aspx?QuestionId=605#.
Wf38EX1yVaw> (accessed on 3 February 2019).
effort to protect their turf  and monopoly over Islamic 
Shari’a.
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